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Real-world attacks can be interpreted as the result of competitive interactions between networks,
ranging from predator-prey networks to networks of countries under economic sanctions. Although
the purpose of an attack is to damage a target network, it also curtails the ability of the attacker,
which must choose the duration and magnitude of an attack to avoid negative impacts on its
own functioning. Nevertheless, despite the large number of studies on interconnected networks,
the consequences of initiating an attack have never been studied. Here, we address this issue by
introducing a model of network competition where a resilient network is willing to partially weaken
its own resilience in order to more severely damage a less resilient competitor. The attacking
network can take over the competitor nodes after their long inactivity. However, due to a feedback
mechanism the takeovers weaken the resilience of the attacking network. We define a conservation
law that relates the feedback mechanism to the resilience dynamics for two competing networks.
Within this formalism, we determine the cost and optimal duration of an attack, allowing a network
to evaluate the risk of initiating hostilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research carried out on competing interacting
networks [1–6] does not take into account the fact that
real-world networks often compete not only to survive
but also to take over or even destroy their competitors
[7]. For example, in international politics and economics,
when one country imposes economic sanctions on an-
other, feedback mechanisms can cause the country im-
posing the sanctions to also be adversely affected. The
decision by a wealthier country to keep military spend-
ing at a high level long enough to exhaust its poorer
competitor can also contribute to its own exhaustion [8].
Similarly, in warfare, any attack depletes the resources of
the attacking force and can elicit a counter-attack from
the competing force [9]. Also, in nature, an incursion
between species can alter the dynamics of predator-prey
interaction [10].
Although, these competing interactions are a
widespread real-world phenomenon, current studies
analyze only effects of attack on attacked networks, but
disregarding its effect on the external attacking network.
For example, for both single and interactive networks,
existing studies on network robustness report that every
network, regardless of the size and architecture, eventu-
ally can be destroyed [11–17]. But, what then prevents a
network from attacking a weaker competitor or, what is
the optimal moment for initiating or ending an attack?
In order to identify the factors that inhibit a network
from attacking and demolishing a weaker competitor
and to determine the optimal moment and duration
of an attack, we develop a theoretical framework that
quantifies the cost of an attack by connecting the
feedback mechanisms and resilience dynamics between
two competing dynamic networks with differing levels of
resilience [18, 19].
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We introduce a general methodology that can be ap-
plied to networks of any size and structure. First, as an il-
lustrative example, we describe two competing Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) networks [20] which we designate network
S and network W. This model differs from the single
network BA model in that the two interconnected net-
works have both intra-network and inter-network links
[21]. One real-world example of this kind of network in-
teraction is firms in an economic network that link with
other firms both domestically and abroad.
Using the preferential attachment (PA) rule [20–22],
we generate networks S and W starting with n0 nodes in
each network. At each time step we add a new node that
connects with mS existing nodes in network S and with
mW,S existing nodes in network W, where the probability
of each connection depends on the total node degrees
in networks S and W. Similarly, using the PA rule we
connect a new node in network W with mW nodes inside
network W and with mS,W = mW,S nodes in network S.
In a broad class of real-world networks, nodes can fail
either due to inherent reason [23] or because their func-
tionality depends on their neighborhood [23, 24]. Hence,
any node in either of the two networks, e.g., a node ni in-
side network S with kS neighbors in its own network and
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FIG. 1: Attacks, failures, takeovers and their cost on the attacking network. In (a), we assume that each node in both the more
resilient (stronger) network S and the less resilient (weaker) network W is described by the same failure probability. Different
nodes spend different times during internal failure—the less opaque a node is, the more time it spends in internal failure. In
(b), if a node in the weaker network W remains inactive more than some threshold time, it will be taken over by the stronger
network S. However, network S pays for this takeover with a reduction of its resilience.
kW,S neighbors in network W, can fail at any moment,
either internally—independent of other nodes—with a
probability p1 or externally with a probability p2. Node
ni externally fails with a probability p2 when, similar
to the Watts model [24], the total fraction of its active
neighbors is less than or equal to a fractional threshold
T which is equal for all nodes in both networks. The
larger the T value, the less resilient the network. We as-
sume that one of the two networks is more resilient than
the other, distinguishing between strong network S and
weak network W. We do so by assigning different frac-
tional thresholds to the strong and weak networks, TS
and TW , respectively, with TS < TW . As in Ref. [23],
we assume that an internally-failed node in network S
or network W recovers from its last internal failure af-
ter a period τ . Consecutive failures of the same node
stretch the effective failure times and introduce hetero-
geneity into the distribution of inactivity periods. Since
in real-world networks it is dangerous for nodes to be in-
active, we allow the strong network to take over nodes in
the weak network when a node ni spends more time in
internal failure than nτ , where n is a constant. Figure 1
qualitatively shows the interaction process.
III. RESULTS
We quantify the current collective state of the strong
and weak networks in terms of the fraction of active
nodes, fS and fW , respectively [23, 25, 26]. We as-
sume that initially on both networks have internal and
external failure probability values of p1 ≡ pX and p2,
respectively. Figure 2(a) shows a two-parameter phase
diagram for each network in which the hysteresis is com-
posed of two spinodals separating two collective states,
i.e., the primarily “active” and the primarily “inactive.”
Figure 2(b) shows that increasing the value of p1 leads
to catastrophic first-order phase transitions in both net-
works. When each network recovers (i.e., when p1 is de-
creased to previous values), the fraction of active nodes
returns to an upper state. Nevertheless, the critical point
in the recovery is well beyond the point at which the
network collapses. Figure 2(b) also shows (solid line)
that the initial choice of parameters makes network S
more resilient to network fluctuations in the value of p1
and that the fluctuation needed to initiate the collapse
of network S (pS1 ≡ pS1c − pX) is much larger than the
fluctuation needed to initiate the collapse of network W
(pW1 ≡ pW1c − pX). Furthermore, network W is closer to
a critical transition than network S.
Because network S has a higher resilience than net-
work W and can more easily withstand fluctuations, S
could induce the collapse of W by increasing p1, but only
if the fraction of its active links is not dramatically re-
duced. Figure 2(b) shows how when network S attacks
network W by increasing p1 to ≈ 0.002 the weak net-
work becomes abruptly dysfunctional. Figure 2(b) also
shows that when the values of p1 are reset to their pre-
attack levels the collapse of network W is permanent (red
dashed line) and, if it ceases its attack, the recovery of
network S is complete and all of its inactive nodes are
reactivated (see blue dashed line Figure 2(b)). Similarly,
when economic sanctions in a financial system are lifted
the weak economies are not restored but the strong eco-
nomics recover after suffering little damage.
Figure 2(c) shows a modified competing network struc-
ture in which there are two interconnected Erdo˝s-Reny
networks [27] with inter-network links randomly chosen.
Although this structure quantitatively differs from the
phase diagram of competing BA networks, the same kind
3of transition occurs in the random configuration. This in-
dicates the generality of these critical transitions in com-
peting networks. We obtain similar results when degree-
degree correlations are introduced between the links con-
necting both networks. Figure 2(d) shows nodes in the
strong network linking with nodes in the weak network
only when they are of similar degree (i.e., “assortative
mixing” [28]). As in the other configurations, the bet-
ter position of the attacker enables the strong network to
destroy the weak one and then return safely to its initial
state.
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
p2
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
p
1
a
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.004 0.008
p1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
f
pW1c p
S
1c
px
b
Network
S
W
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p2
0.000
0.001
0.002
p
1
c
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
p2
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
p
1
d
0.0
0.5
1.0
FIG. 2: Attack strategy between two competing networks
with different resilience levels and intra/inter link architec-
ture. Shown are fractions of active nodes. The most resilient,
strong network S (with TS = 0.3) endangers and partially de-
stroys its own nodes by increasing their internal failure prob-
ability p1 in order to more severely damage the least resilient
network W (with TW = 0.7). Each of S and W has the hys-
teresis composed of two spinodals, representing attacking and
recovery phase. The recovery time is τ = 50 and the takeover
and cost mechanisms are disregarded. (a) Attacking strat-
egy between two competing BA networks with parameters:
mS = mW = 3 and mS,W = mW,S = 2. Strong network
S wants to bring W in parameter space between hystereses
of W (black lines) and S (white lines) where S is predomi-
nantly active and W is predominantly inactive (see, b). Dark
red (blue) is parameter space where both S and W are active
(inactive). (b) For p2 = 0.9, fraction of active nodes in the
strong fS (blue lines) and weak fW (red lines) networks as a
function of the internal failure probability p1. Hysteresis is a
result of increasing p1 from zero to one and then decreasing
it back to zero. The increase of p1 accounts for the attacks
and the decrease for a repair of the network. (c) Same case as
(a) but for two randomly connected competing Erdo˝s-Renyi
networks. (d) Same case as (c) but with an assortative mix-
ing in the connection between networks: nodes with degree
d1 link, with probability 1/|d1 − d2 + 1|, with nodes in the
other network with degree d2.
A. Mean field theory
Using mean-field theory we analytically describe the
attack-and-recovery process between two interconnected
networks with random regular topologies where all nodes
within the same network have the same degree. We as-
sume that each node in network S is linked with kS nodes
in its own network and kW,S nodes in network W. Sim-
ilarly, each node in network W is linked with kW nodes
inside network W and kS,W nodes in network S. In both
networks the fraction of failed nodes is a ≡ 1−f , where f
is the fraction of functional nodes. We can approximate
the values of a at each network by
aS = p
∗
S,1 + pS,2(1− p∗S,1)ES (1)
aW = p
∗
W,1 + pW,2(1− p∗W,1)EW , (2)
where p∗S,1 ≡ 1 − exp(−pS,1τ) [23] denotes the average
fraction of internally failed nodes and pS,2ES denotes the
probability that a node in network S has externally failed,
ES =
tS∑
j=0
j∑
i=0
(
kS
kS − i
)
akS−iS (1− aS)i(
kW,S
kW,S − (j − i)
)
a
kW,S−(j−i)
W (1− aW )j−i. (3)
Here tS represents the absolute threshold of network S
simply related to the fractional threshold TS as TS =
tS/(kS + kW,S): a node in network S can externally fail
with a probability pS,2 only when the number of active
neighbors in both network S and network W is less than
or equal to tS . Similarly, we obtain EW for network W by
replacing S with W, and vice versa, in Eq. (3). Finally,
we set network S to be more resilient than network W,
by setting tS/(kS + kW,S) < tW /(kW + kS,W ).
The analytical results of Fig. 3(a) indicate that when
network S increases the internal failure probability pS,1
and so p∗S,1 in an effort to damage network W it also
causes partial damage to itself. Although it first seems
that increasing p∗S,1 reduces more active nodes in network
S than in network W, when p∗S,1 > 0.18 the fraction of
active nodes in network W drops sharply and eventually
fS > fW . This attack strategy by network S is thus
effective. If p∗S,1 > 0.33, however, network S undergoes
a first order transition that leads to collapse, a situation
that network S clearly must avoid.
Inspecting the recovery of the previous internal failure
probability values after the attack we find that the frac-
tion of active nodes in both networks exhibit a hysteresis
behavior. Note that when the transition at p∗S,1 ∼ 0.33 is
surpassed neither network is able to restore its function-
ing to the levels previous to the attack.
The analytical results indicate that attacking network
S is effective only for certain values of p∗S,1. Thus network
S should increase p∗S,1 only as long as the damage to
network W continues to be greater than the damage to
itself, i.e., only when ∆aW > ∆aS . Figure 3(b) shows
4the region in which attacks by network S are effective
by showing the fraction of failed nodes in both networks
in a two-dimensional phase space as the value of p∗S,1 is
increased. Two solid lines with a slope of one indicate the
region in which an attack by network S is effective. When
the slope of function aW = f(aS) is greater than one
(the region between the two shaded lines), increasing p∗S,1
produces more damage in network W than in network S
and is thus an effective attack strategy.
In order to measure the effect of capturing nodes from
a competitor network and how takeovers can modify the
resilience properties of a network, we design a model in
which network S is again more resilient than network W
(TS < TW ) and where node ni of network W is taken over
by network S if its internal failure time exceeds nτ , where
τ is a certain failure time and n a constant. Note that
the longer a node in network W remains inactive (i.e.,
the higher the value of n), the higher the probably that
it will be acquired by network S. Real-world examples
of this mechanism include sick or disabled prey in an
ecological system [29, 30] or countries whose economic
systems remain in recession for too long a period.
B. Take over and conservation laws
To evaluate the acquisition costs in both networks we
define network wealth (capital) as proportional to two
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FIG. 3: Identifying the optimal parameters for attacking a
weak network. Analytical approach. Strong network S (less
vulnerable) uses its own probability of internal failures p∗S,1 to
cause damage in weak network W and, unavoidably, induce
a partial self-destruction. Model parameters are: kS = 20,
kS,W = kW,S = 10, kS = 5, tS = 10, tW = 10, pS,2 =
pW,2 = 0.8, and p
∗
W,1 = 0.05. In (a), fraction of active nodes in
network S and W, fS = 1−aS and fW = 1−aW , respectively.
Strong network S (blue) deliberately initiates its own failures
(increasing p∗S,1) to create larger damage in a weak (more
vulnerable) network W (red). Note that the fraction of active
nodes exhibits a hysteresis behavior for both networks, with
a critical point at pC ≈ 0.33. In (b), we investigate when
S should stop attacking W by increasing its probability of
internal failure p∗S,1. Shown are the fractions of failed nodes,
aS = 1 − fS and aW = 1 − fW . Between points C and D
(dashed lines), an increase of p∗S,1 induces more failures in the
weaker network, leading to a comparative benefit. Beyond
point D, the attack is not worthwhile for network S since it
suffers the consequences more intensely than its competitor.
variables: the total number of links in the network—
as defined in conservation biology [31, 32]—and the re-
silience of the network. Note that if two networks have
the same number of links but different resiliencies their
wealth is not equal. Note also that when network S ac-
quires a node of degree kW,i from network W the overall
resilience of network S decreases because it has acquired
a weaker node. Thus network S pays a instantaneous,
collective cost through a feedback mechanism that de-
creases its resilience from an initial threshold TS to a
new threshold T ′S .
One of the important issues in dynamic systems that
have a critical point as an attractor is whether a conser-
vation of energy is required in local dynamic interactions
[33–35]. To quantify how threshold T ′s changes in com-
peting networks, we define a conservation law that relates
the feedback mechanism to the resilience dynamics as
N 〈kS〉 (T ′S − TS) = kW,i(TW − T ′S). (4)
Here N is the size of the strong network, 〈kS〉 its average
degree, and kW,i the degree of the node that has been
taken over. Thus, we assume that the more important
the acquired node (i.e., the larger its degree kW,i), the
greater the cost to the resilience of network S, making it
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FIG. 4: Cost and takeover mechanisms in two competing
BA networks. (a) Threshold T ′S of network S as a function
of time for two competing BA networks with n = 2.5 and
τ = 50. Fluctuations in the evolution of T ′S are a consequence
of the degree of the acquired node: the higher the degree the
higher the increase of T ′S . (b) Fraction of takeovers and final
threshold as a function of the time nτ required to acquire a
node from the weak network, with τ = 50. As n increases,
the number of takeovers decreases to zero. At the same time,
the resilience of network S tends to the initial value TS = 0.3.
(c) Due to takeovers the fraction of active nodes in the more
resilient network S can increase to values higher than one. In
this example, network W is irreversibly damaged after p1 is
restored to its initial value.
5more vulnerable to future attacks. As a result, when a
predator (strong) network S increases its size N and its
degree 〈ks〉, its acquisition cost, T ′S − TS , will decrease.
Here we quantify how threshold T ′S of the stronger net-
work changes in competing networks where we assume
that threshold TW of the weaker network does not change
because every node has the same threshold. The stronger
network S has the initial number of nodes NS , the aver-
age degree 〈kS〉. After a multiple takeovers, where S took
over nodes nw,1, nw,2, ..., nw,n with degrees kw,1, kw,2,
..., kw,n, respectively, by using Eq. (4) we obtain
T ′S =
(kw,1 + kw,1 + ...+ kw,n)TW +NS〈kS〉TS
NS〈kS〉+ kw,1 + kw,1 + ...+ kw,n . (5)
Figure 4(a) shows that when network S acquires nodes
in network W the threshold T ′S of network S is increas-
ingly affected as time passes. In this example, a node in
network W is taken over by network S when the node is
in failure state longer than nτ time steps, where n = 2.5
and τ = 50. Note that as network S acquires weak nodes,
its threshold T ′S increases and it becomes more vulner-
able. Figure 4(b) shows the interplay between the time
required to acquire a node nτ and the threshold T ′S . Note
that as nτ increases, takeovers become increasingly rare
and the final threshold of network S approaches its initial
resilience, here TS = 0.3.
Figure 4(c) shows that, if the example in Figure 2(b) is
extended to include a takeover mechanism, a fraction of
active nodes fS in network S—measured relative to the
initial number of nodes in each network—reaches values
higher than one, with a peak at py → pz. Note that
when attacks cease (e.g., when, in an economic system,
sanctions are lifted) decreasing the value of p1, pz → pw,
the fraction of active nodes in network S increases but
network W is left irreversibly damaged (see the closed
hysteresis p′y → p′z → p′w).
C. Threshold diversity in competing networks
Thus far we have studied competing interconnected
networks in which there is only one threshold characteriz-
ing each network. However, in real-world interconnected
networks commonly the functionality of a node in a given
network is not equally sensitive on the neighbors in its
own and the other network. To this end, we assume that
node ni in network S can externally fail with probabil-
ity p2 if the fraction of the active neighbors of node ni
in network S is equal to or lower than some threshold
TS , or if the fraction of the active neighbors of node ni
in network W is equal to or lower than some threshold
TW,S . We similarly define external failure in the less re-
silient network W by replacing threshold TS with TW .
The functioning of each node is thus dependent on its
neighbors in network S and network W, but with different
sensitivities—different resilience to external fluctuations
Figure 5(a) shows, for a given set of parameters, a
two-parameter phase diagram of competing networks, a
model that incorporates the threshold separation for ex-
ternal failure but excludes takeover and feedback mech-
anisms. This model resembles that in Fig. 2 but uti-
lizes different configurations. Suppose network S sponta-
neously activates at time t0 but, due to differences in the
variables characterizing network S and network W, initi-
ates a substitution mechanism, not a takeover. Thus each
time node ni in network W spends a time period in an
inactive mode that exceeds the substitution time —e.g.,
in ecology, a time period without food— ni is replaced
by a new node from network S. Figure 5(b) shows the
fraction of active nodes in each network calculated rela-
tive to the initial number of nodes at time t0. Fractions
of active nodes of both networks exhibit a catastrophic
discontinuity (a phase flip) at t ≈ 2, 000, which is char-
acteristic of a first-order transition. Since both networks
are interdependent, substituting nodes from the less re-
silient network W affects the functionality of network S
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FIG. 5: Quantification of the optimal attack duration.
Model parameters are: mS = 6,mW = 3, mS,W = mW,S = 2.
Similar as in Fig. 4 but now with two thresholds used for
defining resilience of each network. External failure thresh-
olds are TW = 0.7, TS = 0.3, and TS,W = 0.4. In (a), we
find the phase diagram in model parameters (p1, p2) where
each network has its own hysteresis. The takeover mecha-
nism is disregarded and recovery time is τ = 50. In (b), for
each network we show the time evolution of the fractions of
active nodes with the takeover mechanism included where we
use a takeover period of 1.5τ , p1 = 0.0004, and p2 = 0.6.
At some point, S creates larger damage in a weak (less re-
silient) network W than to itself. (c) Related with (b), as
a result of the attack, both networks are damaged, but W
is damaged more. We also show how the fractions change
with decreasing p1 during the recovery phase. (d) Early-
warning signal for determining when the attack should be
stopped, defined as the change in the ratio between two frac-
tions, fI(t + ∆t)/fII(t + ∆t) − fI(t)/fII(t), where ∆t = 20.
The attack should be stopped when the indicator reaches the
maximum.
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FIG. 6: Evaluating the effect of the cost mechanism. Model
parameters are: mS = mW = 3, mS,W = mW,S = 2, p1 =
0.0004 p2 = 0.6. (a) The cost of the attacking strategy with
takeover mechanism additionally decreases network resilience.
The fraction of active nodes exhibits more discontinuities than
in the case where the cost of an attack was excluded (Fig. 5).
This is a consequence of the larger change in the resilience of
S due to inclusion of the cost mechanism. (b) The fraction
of takeovers and threshold T ′S of the stronger network S as a
function of takeover time nτ , with τ = 50.
even more dramatically than that shown in Fig. 2. Thus
beyond some threshold we expect that additional weaken-
ing of network W will also permanently damage network
S. This demonstrates how dangerous an attacking strat-
egy can be for an attacker in a system of interdependent
networks, e.g., between countries that are at the same
time competitors and economics partners.
Figure 5(c) shows that when the attacks and substitu-
tions cease, the fractions of active nodes in network S and
network W reach points C ′ and C ′′, respectively. If the
probability of internal failure p1 spontaneously decreases
during the recovery period, because of network interde-
pendence the functionality of network S is not substan-
tially improved. The triumph of network S over network
W has its price. In ecology, for example, although the
population of each species tends to increase, a dominance
strategy is risky, e.g., the extinction of a key species can
trigger, through a cascade mechanism [15, 36], the ex-
tinction of many other species [37].
Figure 5(d) shows the change in the ratio between the
fraction of active nodes in network S and network W as a
function of time. This ratio can serve as an early-warning
mechanism [38] that indicates when attacks should be
stopped. Optimally, the stopping time for attacks will
be when the ratio reaches its maximum.
Finally, Fig. 6(a) shows that when the feedback mech-
anism (the cost of taking over) defined in Eq. (4) is
included, the fraction of active nodes in each network
exhibits an even richer discontinuous behavior than in
Fig. 5(c), where the cost was excluded. After 50,000
steps, because of the decrease in network S’s resilience
after each substitute, the final fraction of active nodes in
network S is substantially smaller than the correspond-
ing fraction in Fig. 5(c) (i.e., when the cost is excluded).
At the same time, Fig. 6(b) shows that an increase in the
takeover time nτ decreases the fraction of substitutes.
IV. SUMMARY
In conclusion, we have presented a theoretical frame-
work based on resilience, competition, and phase tran-
sitions to introduce a cost-of-attack concept that relates
feedback mechanisms to resilience dynamics defined us-
ing a linear conservation law. Our model for competing
networks can be applied across a wide range of human
activities, from medicine and finance to international re-
lations, intelligence services, and military operations.
We focus on a specific context where one more re-
silient network attacks the less resilient competitor net-
work. The model assumptions about the structure and
dynamics for two interactive networks with competing
interactions and different resilience levels have to be ad-
justed in regard to different real world scenarios (see the
electronic supplementary material, S4).
The ability to measure attacker network resilience and
its attack cost is crucial because every weakening of the
resilience reduces the probability of the network survival
under future attacks. For example, in political socio-
economic systems a network-based approach for overcom-
ing competing countries could be more effective by apply-
ing economical sanctions than carrying out military ac-
tions. Interdependent links established between countries
during prosperous times can facilitate sanctions (inten-
tional fluctuations) that are used as a weapon when more
resilient countries try to overcome less resilient coun-
tries. They can also facilitate the global propagation of
economic recessions (spontaneous fluctuations). During
long economic crises these interdependent links can be-
come fatal for less resilient countries, whose weakness
is enhanced by being underdogs in a global network-of-
networks and, at the same time, whose resources can be
captured by more powerful countries.
Although, our proposed framework is suited for repre-
senting the most simplest case of bilateral economic in-
terdependence between just two countries (networks), it
provides the basis for more general scenarios of alliances
of more countries (networks). The concept of alliance
where some countries unite in order to attack some other
alliance is especially interesting when there is heterogene-
ity in resilience of allied attacker countries. For example,
economically most dominant countries can increase their
dominance at the expense of their partners in the alliance
or they can, on the other hand, depend on the alliance’s
weakest country (see the supplementary material, S4 A).
In addition to the intentional fluctuations characteris-
tic of human societies, our methodology can also be ap-
plied to a broad class of complex systems in which spon-
taneous fluctuations occur, from brain functioning to eco-
logical habitats and climate fluctuations [31, 37, 39–44].
The methodology is based on specific structure, dynamics
and mechanisms of the model of networks with compet-
ing interactions and different resilience levels, that have
to be adjusted for different systems and contexts of ap-
plication (see the supplementary material, S4).
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iSupplementary material: The cost of attack in competing networks
S1. RESILIENCE DYNAMICS IN FINANCE
Here we demonstrate that the resilience dynamics in fi-
nance can be presented in terms of a conservation (linear)
law, where the threshold is controlled by an asset-debt
ratio. Recall that in our model a node externally fails
with a certain probability when the total fraction of its
active neighbors is equal to or lower than the fractional
threshold Th. The larger the Th value, the less resilient
the network. In quantifying the impact of a perturba-
tion (attack) on the network, we shall demonstrate that
the more severe the attack, the larger the impact on the
network resilience.
Suppose a bank ni has an interbank asset A
B
i invested
equally in each of its ki neighboring banks. Bank ni has
also some asset Ai, considered as a stochastic variable.
Following Refs. [1, 2], we define a bank to be solvent
(active) when (1 − φ)ABi + Ai − LBi > 0, i.e., when the
bank’s assets exceed its liabilities, LBi . Here φ represents
the fraction of inactive neighboring banks that ni can
withstand and still function properly. Note that this φ is
related to threshold Th as Th = 1 − φ, since we assume
that the number of incoming links is equal to the number
of outgoing links, ABi = L
B
i . The larger the Ai value, the
more stable the bank. Suppose that for each bank there
is a linear dependence between ABi , Ai, and the network
degree k—e.g., that ABi = ki and Ai = 0.5ki. Then a
bank is inactive when 1 − Th = φ = 0.5 (Th = 0.5) or
when at least 50% of its neighboring banks are inactive.
Let us assume next that Ai increases due to an external
perturbation Ai = 0.5 + . Then the new threshold is
equal to
T ′h = 0.5− /ki, (6)
or
ki(T
′
h − Th) = −. (7)
If the external perturbation is negative (positive), or
alternatively, the asset increases (decreases) (Eq. (6)),
the threshold increases (decreases) and the resilience de-
creases (increases). The larger the number of neighbors
(ki), the smaller the change in the network resilience.
Note that if the external perturbation attacking one node
is shared not only by its neighbors but by the entire net-
work with N nodes, then ki is replaced by N〈ki〉 as in
Eq. (4) in the paper. Note that if we replace the linear
dependence between assets and degree with a non-linear
(power-law) dependence, e.g., ABi = k
α
i , where α is a
constant parameter, we obtain a similar relationship to
Eq. (7), kαi (T
′
h − Th) = −.
S2. RESILIENCE DYNAMICS IN
INTERCONNECTED NETWORKS
We focus on a mean field approximation of the level of
external and internal failures between nodes for two inter-
connected networks. Every node has an internal failure
probability p1 [3]—assumed, for reasons of simplicity, to
be the same in both networks, p1,S = p1,W = p1. If
each node in network S has kS links with nodes in its
own network and kW,S links with nodes in network W,
here we define that there must be more than mS nodes
in network S and mW,S nodes in network W if the nodes
in S are to function properly. In contrast, if the num-
ber of inactive nodes in network S is ≤ mS , the proba-
bility that the node in network S will externally fail is
p2. Similarly, if the number of inactive nodes in net-
work W is ≤ mW,S , the probability that the node in net-
work S will externally fail is p2. To simplify we can use
p2,S = p2,W = p2. We denote the time averaged fractions
of failed nodes in network S and network W as aS and
aW , respectively. Using combinatorics, we calculate the
probability that a node in network S will have a critically
damaged neighborhood among its neighbors in S to be
ES =
∑mS
j=0
(
kS
kS−j
)
akS−jS (1 − aS)j . Similarly, we calcu-
late the probability that a node in network S will have a
critically damaged neighborhood among its neighbors in
W to be EW =
∑mW,S
j=0
(
kW,S
kW,S−j
)
a
kW,S−j
W (1 − aW )j . The
probability that a node will fail externally due to failures
in network S (network W) is p2E
S (p2E
W ). If we denote
the internal failures in network S by A, and the external
failures by B, and the external failures in network W by
C, then the probability that a randomly chosen node in
S will fail is a1 ≈ P (A) + P (B) + P (C)− P (A)(P (B) +
P (C))−P (B)P (C)+P (A)P (B)P (C). If we assume that
A, B, and C are not mutually exclusive, but interdepen-
dent events, we come to
aS ≈ p∗1 + p2(ES + EW )− p∗1p2(ES + EW ) (8)
− p2p2ESEW + p∗1p2p2ESEW . (9)
where p∗1 = 1 − exp(−p1τ), and as in Ref. [3] node j
recovers from an internal failure after a time period τ .
Similarly, from the above equation we obtain the fraction
of failed nodes aW in network W (either internally or
externally failed) by interchanging S and W.
S3. COUPLED BA INTERDEPENDENT
NETWORKS WITH EQUAL CONNECTIVITY
BUT DIFFERENT THRESHOLD
We now focus on two interdependent BA networks
with equal connectivity but different threshold, where
TS < TW . Fig. S1 shows that for each of the two in-
terconnected networks the fraction of active nodes si-
multaneously jumps from a stable state to another one.
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Phase-flipping is obtained by setting the network close
to a critical point that is reported for a single network in
Ref. [3]. Since the threshold in network S is substantially
smaller than in network W, and so S is more resilient
than network W, the fraction of active nodes in network
S is larger than the fraction of active nodes in network
W. Thus the volatile phase-flipping in network function-
ality is more dangerous for network W than for network
S. The fractions, as a function of time, can approximately
model the populations of preys and predators and so be
related to the periodic solutions of the Lotka-Volterra
(predator-prey) equations [4].
S4. APPLICABILITY OF THE MODEL TO
REAL WORLD SCENARIOS
Most real world systems are composed of networks
which interact with each other in different ways. In our
model we focus on a specific context where one more
resilient (strong) network (attack initiator) attacks the
less resilient (weaker) competitor network (attack tar-
get). The proposed model depends on the structure of
two interactive competing networks and the defined dy-
namics between initiating an attack against a competitor
network and the consequences that might weaken the at-
tack initiator resilience. Within this framework assump-
tions about the structure and dynamics for two interac-
tive networks with competing interactions and different
resilience levels have to be adjusted in regard to different
real world scenarios.
For the structure of interactive networks we use
multilayer network model distinguishing between intra-
network and inter-network connections. Although in our
analysis we focused on specific architectures of intra-
network and inter-network connections, in general they
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
t
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
f
Network
S
W
FIG. S1: Coupled interdependent networks with equal con-
nectivity but different threshold. For the parameters we
use: τ = 50, p1 = 0.0012, p2 = 0.48, mS = mW = 3,
mS,W = mW,S = 2, TS = 0.3, TW = 0.7. The larger the
Th value, the less resilient the network. We obtain that both
networks exhibit the same hysteresis. The parameters are set
in a part of phase space to enable phase flipping between ac-
tive and inactive states. However, due to different thresholds,
network S is more resilient than network W—the average frac-
tion of active nodes in network S is practically always larger
than in network W.
can be arbitrarily chosen depending on real world exam-
ples. Each competing network is formed by the intra-
network connections between its own nodes, while inter-
actions between competing networks are determined by
inter-network connections between nodes from two op-
posing competitor networks. We also assumed static
intra-network and inter-network connections, while in
different real world examples these connections can also
change through time and depend on different spatial and
temporal attributes.
When we represent both an attacker or attacked sys-
tem as a network, we must also decide which attributes
and level of details of the system are of interest for a spe-
cific real-world scenario. A single node in network repre-
sents a particular component of a system or aggregated
set of similar components, while the consequences of an
attack are described by an active or an inactive node’s
state. The global collective state of both the attacker and
the attacked network is measured by the total fraction of
active nodes in each network. Finally, the interpretation
of node’s activity and inactivity depends on the applica-
tion context of different real world attack scenarios.
In order to explain the general network vulnerabil-
ity to global cascades of local and external node fail-
ures/inactivations caused by attack consequences, we
model node dynamics by a cascade contagion model with
stochastic internal and external activation/inactivation
process [3], inspired by the Watts threshold model
[5] where each node has a probability to internally
fail/inactivate independently of other nodes. At the same
time, the probability to externally fail/inactivate if a frac-
tion of its active intra-network and inter-network neigh-
bors is less than or equal to a specified fractional thresh-
old. This fractional threshold can be interpreted as the
network resilience to failures due to interdependencies,
the larger the value of the fractional threshold, the less
resilient the network.
We assume that the attacker network has a higher re-
silience than an opponent network and that it is willing
to partially weaken its own resilience in order to more
severely damage a less resilient competitor. Attack con-
cept and also its influence on resilience dynamics of the
attacker is based on causing critical fraction of active
neighbors for nodes from an opponent network, and us-
ing takeover and substitution mechanisms for them af-
ter their long inactivity. However, this concept is highly
context-dependent and its mechanisms have to be prop-
erly mapped in regard to different real work scenarios.
As the attacker network has higher resilience than
an opponent network it can induce the implicit indi-
rect attack by increasing the probability of internal fail-
ures/inactivations of its nodes causing critical fraction
of active neighbors for nodes from an opponent network.
In addition, takeover and substitution mechanisms define
direct attack on an opponent network. Takeover mech-
anism is related to the explicit attack on an opponent
network with the same type of nodes as the attacker
network and the explicit reduction of the attacker net-
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work resilience by increasing its fractional threshold. On
the other hand, the substitution mechanism represents
the explicit attack on an opponent network with implicit
reduction of the attacker network resilience by having
nodes whose state is more dependent on nodes form the
opponent networks.
Although we focus on the most simplified scenario of
two interactive competing networks where just one and
more resilient network can attack a less resilient opponent
network, the introduced framework provides the basis for
more general scenarios of alliances of more different net-
works with also different interaction types between them
(e.g. competing intra-specific/network, antagonistic, mu-
tualistic) and strategies for attack as well as defense. How
many new parameters have to be introduced for this sce-
nario also depends highly on the context of the study of
interest. We can observe each network collective state
and resilience dynamics separately or depending on their
affiliation while a specific attack or defense strategy is
taking place.
How successful our network model might be when ap-
plied in practice depends first on how capable we are in
estimating model parameters and mapping them to real-
world context. As described before our model is struc-
tured with the architecture of intra-network and inter-
network connections which define networks structure and
constraints for an interaction, and with parameters for
cascade dynamics including internal and external failure
probabilities, the fractional threshold and the limit for
inactivity period. We show how these parameters can
be mapped to two real world scenarios from ecology and
political socio-economy application domains.
A. Socio-economic system: competing inter-firm
network of countries under economic sanctions
Here we demonstrate how our modeling framework
is mapped to a specific political-socio-economic scenario
where one country imposes economic sanctions or similar
political-economic attack/action against another coun-
try. In this regard we explain interpretation of model
parameters, intra/inter-network architecture and activa-
tion/inactivation dynamics. A critical aspect of political-
economic attack/action is the economic costs endured
not only by the targeted country, but also by the sender
country (the one making the action). Although, we are
focusing here on the most simplest case of bilateral eco-
nomic interdependence between just two countries, such
actions can also bring to economic consequences to other
third parties like neighbours countries of the target or its
trading partners, but as well as senders. Economic sanc-
tions are deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or
threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial re-
lations and are most effective when aimed against friends
and close trading partners as these countries have more
to lose than countries with which the sender has limited
or adversarial relations.
Interdependent links established between countries
during prosperous times can facilitate sanctions (inten-
tional fluctuations) that are used as a weapon when more
resilient countries try to overcome less resilient coun-
tries. They can also facilitate the global propagation of
economic recessions (spontaneous fluctuations). During
long economic crises these interdependent links can be-
come fatal for less resilient countries. Similarly, when
economic sanctions are lifted for the weaker economies is
much harder to restore than for the stronger economics
which recover after suffering little damage.
In order to explain the economic cost for the coun-
try imposing the sanctions, we first specify state of the
country’s economic system by collective activity of in-
dividual firms which are part of the country economy.
Firms are connected to each other directly or indirectly
through their business transactions (i.e. obtaining ma-
terials from suppliers, delivering goods/products to ser-
vices or R&D cooperation). Economic network of each
country is represented by inter-firm network assuming
that intra-network connections specify cooperative inter-
actions between firms of same country, and inter-network
connections specify interactions between firms in differ-
ent countries that are subjected to the bilateral economic
relation between two countries.
As many firms borrow from and lend to each other, and
in particular when these firms are speculative and depen-
dent on the credit flow, shocks to the liquidity of some
firms may cause the other firms to also experience finan-
cial difficulties [6]. The way how geographically localized
shock propagate through such inter-firms networks de-
termines country resilience to the shock experienced by
their corresponding firms. These dynamic vulnerabilities
of firms can be related to the fractional threshold param-
eter that can be controlled by its asset-debt ratio where
activity/inactivity of a firm is determined by its solvency
(see S1. Resilience dynamics in finance).
The attack concepts is related to inducing the im-
plicit indirect attack by increasing probability of internal
failures/inactivations of its firms causing target country
firms to become insolvent. In addition, takeover mech-
anisms define attack on the target country economy by
taking over their firms which are insolvent for some crit-
ical time.
The extension of our modeling framework from bilat-
eral economic interdependence between just two inter-
firm networks of competing countries to more general
scenarios of network alliances where some countries unite
in order to attack some other alliance is especially in-
teresting when we introduce the resilience heterogeneity
of allied attacker countries. The resilience heterogene-
ity of allied attackers can induce opposing interests and
attack strategies between partners as well as provide de-
scriptions of scenarios where economically most domi-
nant countries increase their dominance relative to other
countries and at the expense of their partner countries
in the alliance or where, on the other hand, economically
strong countries depend on alliance’s weakest country.
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For example, suppose two countries, I and II imposing
economic sanctions at the third country, III, where I is
more resilient than II and both I and II are more resilient
than III. A country resilience can be different since II
is more linked with III than I. When the sanctions are
lifted, the relative resilience between I and II can be in-
creased making I even more dominant than before the
sanctions. But on the other hand due to the interdepen-
dencies between allied countries, i.e. countries I and II,
attack strategy of I is dependent also on the state of II.
B. Ecological system: competing animal social
networks under predator-prey interactions
Here we demonstrate how our modeling framework is
mapped to two competing animal social networks under
predator-prey interactions. We explain possible choices
and an interpretation for intra/inter-network structures
and activation/inactivation dynamics for a specific sce-
nario where individuals from one predator species attack
individuals from one prey species. A predator is an an-
imal that hunts and kills other animals (its preys) for
food. An interpretation of predators and preys inter-
nal or external activity depends on the given context
of the study of interest and the interpretation of their
intra/inter-network connections.
The intra-network structure for attacking (predator)
and attacked (prey) networks can be represented by cor-
responding socio-spatial network of their individuals [7–
10]. While, inter-network connections, i.e. connections
between predator and prey individuals, determine which
predator individuals can come in close contact with which
prey individuals to hunt them based on spatial and tem-
poral factors. Interactions between animal individuals
are highly dependent on their spatial proximity. Thus
determining the structure of social animal network also
depends on given spatial context [7]. Recent technolog-
ical innovations in tracking devices and reality mining
approaches are starting to enable remote monitoring and
collection of detailed information of behaviors of indi-
vidual animals at high spatial and temporal resolution
[11–13].
A structure of social network between animal individ-
uals influence diversity of social behaviors such as find-
ing and choosing a sexual partner, making movement de-
cisions, engaging in foregoing or anti-predator behavior
which is manifested at the population level in the form
of habitat use, mating systems, information or disease
transmission. Social interactions between individuals of
same species can differ in their type (competitive, cooper-
ative, sexual), frequency and duration. Animals modify
their social interactions in response to changes in exter-
nal conditions such as climate, predation pressure, and
social environment [7]. Although, interactions among an-
imals are dynamic, many animal social network studies
examine static structures.
For a simplified predator-prey interaction scenario we
can assume static cooperative interactions and that there
are no competing interactions between individuals of the
same species, i.e. infraspecific competition is not taken
into account. Cooperating interactions between individ-
uals play an important role in the spreading of informa-
tion within the network affecting an access to resources
and the probability of predation of an individual. For
example, individuals that have large number of intra-
network connections can be better in discovering new
food patches.
With that interpretation of the intra-network and
inter-network connections, we can model predators coor-
dinated attack by their activation dynamics. In this con-
text it is reasonable to assume that a node in attacked
(prey) network will externally fail (be killed by preda-
tors) if there is enough activated predators (i.e. fraction
of active inter-neighbors larger then given threshold) that
are in close range of the prey (i.e. those connected with
inter-network connections). As usual, prey can also ex-
ternally fail (die or migrate) if its fraction of active intra-
neighbors is equal or smaller then the fractional thresh-
old. In this context we can interpret internal and external
failure/activation probabilities, and the limit for inactiv-
ity period for predators as their opportunity, exigency
and willingness to hunt prey together in certain time.
While those parameters in prey’s case can be interpret
as a way how prey sustains predators attacks or keeps a
certain habitat patch active with its own species through
reproduction. Prey organisms that are difficult to find,
catch, kill or consume will survive and reproduce.
The explained attack concept is in contrast to the in-
direct attack concept where inactive/failed states of at-
tacker nodes cause external failure of attacked network
nodes. This assumption is reasonable in a scenario where
inter-network connections represent prey dependencies
on its predators, i.e. where for each prey there is a needed
fraction of active predators for them to survive because
the active predators balance the population size of a prey
(see also section S3. Coupled BA interdependent net-
works with equal connectivity but different threshold). In
that scenario, predators and prey depend on each other in
that the predators rely on prey as food source, but in turn
they also keep prey population against over-population
which could cause decrease of their food source. Beside
that, in some cases prey species can even facilitate its own
predator [14]. A possible context that relies on predator
and prey interdependence is explanation of how a disease
or other internal disturbances in predator population can
effect prey population dynamics and vice versa.
In contrast to socio-economic scenario of competing
network of countries’ firms, takeover mechanism is not
suitable attack concept for scenario of predator-prey in-
teractions where we model interaction between social net-
work of different node types, but substitution mechanism
is suitable to represent additional level of predation influ-
ence on prey population. In general predation influences
organisms at two ecological levels. At the level of the in-
dividual, the prey organism has an abrupt decline of its
vlifetime reproductive success, because it will never repro-
duce again, and at the level of the community, predation
reduces the number of individuals in the prey popula-
tion. Accordingly, the direct cost for strong predator
which easily hunts and kills its prey is generally negligi-
ble, but indirect cost can be manifested through the fact
that each reduction in prey abundance impedes finding a
next prey. On the other hand, the direct cost is notice-
able for intraguild predators, predators that kill and eat
other predators of different species at the same trophic
level [15, 16].
Classical models of predator-prey population dynam-
ics, often considered as the basic building blocks of larger,
food-web models, explain how tropic interactions lead
to oscillatory population cycles. These models assume
well-mixed population where all pairs of individuals have
equal probabilities of interacting with each other which
corresponds to a complete graph structure. This means
that the encounter rate between predators and prey is
expressed in a mass-action fashion, i.e. as a product of
prey and predator landscape densities [15]. Our model
can describe mechanistic approach of predator-prey in-
teractions within structured population of individuals of
two animal species.
Animal social networks are harder to determine and
observe than human social networks as animal network
data must be collected by direct observation of interac-
tions between individual animals [11, 12]. For some large
herding species it may be possible to count every indi-
vidual, but for many species this is not possible. In cases
when is too time consuming to collect animal network
data at individual level due to difficulties of capturing
and identifying individuals, it can be useful to observe
categories of individuals and consider interactions be-
tween them. Since spatial proximity is significant factor
for establishing and maintaining cooperation between in-
dividuals, we can observe interactions between predators
and prey through patches they occupy [17, 18].
While in social animal networks, one node represents
just a single individual of a given species and each edge
represents some form of interaction between two indi-
viduals, in food webs and ecological network studies a
node typically represents a species while connections be-
tween nodes represent different types of interactions be-
tween species. Species may interact with each other
through antagonism (prey-predator, host-parasitoid, or
host-parasite interaction), competition, or mutualism
[19]. Food webs can provide initial blueprints of inter-
connections between animal socio-spatial networks when
extending our modeling framework from interaction be-
tween just two species networks to more general scenario
of network alliances where several predator and/or prey
networks can cooperate or compete between each other.
For example, in the case when two prey species have
a common predator, one prey species can lead to indi-
rect exclusion of the other species or the case where two
predators alone compete for a single prey species, one
species is always excluded by the other, even in the pres-
ence of a top predator.
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